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Citizenship and Identity:
Being Hungarian in Slovakia and Romanian 
in Serbia and Ukraine
Central and Eastern Europe is a perfect laboratory for the study of 
interaction between borders, identities and citizenship; and the rela-
tionship between minorities, the state they live in and their kin-state. 
These relations are constantly evolving and fluctuating.1 National 
minorities are spread across newly-established and nationalizing 
states, sometimes at the border of their kin-state, sometimes further 
away, following both the political and national reconfigurations after 
the fall of multinational empires like the Hapsburg, Ottoman and 
the Tsarist Empire after World War I, and multinational states like 
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia after 1989. In this 
context, we aim to question the self-identification of national minori-
ties living at the border of their kin-state that gives them a certain 
form of protection through various processes and legislation, like citi-
zenship. Based on a field study made of interviews and focus-groups, 
we examine through a comparative framework the case of Hungar-
ians living in Slovakia and Romanians living in Serbia and Ukraine 
to determine how minorities understand citizenship as a manifesta-
tion of their relations with their kin-state and the nationalizing host 
state. We look at how interpretations of citizenship relate to other 
community ties, how these are used to define the differences between 
‘us’ and ‘them’, and whether and how they build into the self-identi-
fication of minority members, since we assume each individual has a 
multi-layered identity2, where different identifications compete with 
each-other based on the context in which that identity is called upon. 
Our fieldwork is multi-site with two different national minori-
ties in three different countries. In October 2013, and February and 
March 2014, four focus-groups were conducted with Hungarians 
living in Slovakia and one in Budapest. The latter included people 
1 Brubaker, Rogers: Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the national question in 
the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996 and Brubaker, Rogers: 
Nationalizing states revisited: projects and processes of nationalization in post-Soviet 
states. In Danero Iglesias, Julien; Weinblum, Sharon and Stojanovic, Nenad (Eds.): 
New nation-states and national minorities. Colchester: ECPR Press. 2013. 11-38.
2 Hall, Stuart: Political Belonging in a world of multiple identities. In Vertovec, 
Steven and Cohen, Robin (Eds.): Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and 
Practice. Oxford: University of Oxford Press. 2002. 25-31.
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who moved and live in Hungary for a long time but who were born 
in Slovakia where their families remained.3 In March, May and June 
2014, focus-groups and semi-structured interviews were conducted in 
Voivodina and Central Serbia (17 interviews and 3 focus-groups) and 
in Bukovina in Ukraine in May and June 2014 (17 interviews and 4 
focus-groups). The number of participants in each group was from 
five to twelve and the age-distribution of the groups was heteroge-
neous. Discussions were carried out with Hungarians and Romanians 
in their native language. The moderators of the focus-groups used 
the same set of questions but all of the groups had their own dynamic 
– different shifts of emphasis in the discussions occurred in each 
group. The discussions were anonymous and included both minority 
members with and without the citizenship of their kin-state.
Our paper proceeds as follows: first, we discuss the concepts of 
national identity and citizenship that are paramount for under-
standing citizenship policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Next, we 
present kin-state policies towards ethnic Hungarians and Romanians 
in order to establish the framework of reference for our later analysis 
of minority identity structures. The main part of our paper criti-
cally evaluates the discernible patterns and configurations of iden-
tity structures that different members of the minority groups exhibit 
in their dealing with everyday issues such as language use, defining 
the homeland or distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. We pay special 
attention to citizenship and how minority members relate to the citi-
zenship offered by the kin-state, whether this formal channel of iden-
tification translates into a new sense of belonging or remains a flex-
ible and instrumental bond between the state and the individual. We 
seek to learn whether newly acquired kin-state citizenship changes 
the hierarchy of identity structures by making kin-state citizenship 
the most valued identifier among all others.
National Identity and Citizenship
National identity is a concept around which politics can be, and 
often is, organised. In our interpretation, the nation is a mentally 
constructed, imagined political community4 and we assume that 
national identity is a form of collective identity that is made up by 
selected cultural, ethnic, economic, political, legal and territorial 
3 This research project was supported by the Institute for Minority Studies, Centre 
for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Science and led by Attila Papp Z.
4 Anderson, Benedict: Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism. London: Verso. 1983.
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components, which are interrelated with each other.5 As a system 
of cultural representation, national identity is closely connected to 
the feeling of uniqueness and the differentiation from the “others” – 
drawing borders between those who do and do not share the national 
values.6 Accepting this interpretation, we assume that national 
identity is not something stable and coherent but rather fragile and 
contextually changing.7
Yet, as Brubaker highlights, the state is one of the most influen-
tial identifiers and in this sense the nation is not only an imagined 
community but also an important political project and a discursive 
frame of identification.8 Citizenship is the institutionalisation of 
the relation between the state and the individual. This relation is 
based mainly on legal principles; however, citizenship is not a formal, 
stable and universal concept but rather a “set of mutual, contested 
claims between agents of states and members of socially-constructed 
categories.”9 Citizenship laws in many cases include also what it 
means to be a member of the national community.10 In these cases, 
citizenship practices of the state can be interpreted as a channel or 
a tool through which the state defines who can be a member of the 
given community and who cannot. The state deals with individuals 
not as a group of people but as well-defined categories of citizens, 
often categorized on an ethnic/national basis rather than a civic one. 
This in turn blurs the distinction between the category of citizens 
that is not equal to the category of nationals.11
In Central and Eastern European countries, (national) self-deter-
mination is often based on ethnic, cultural and linguistic criteria and 
this also determines citizenship policies and the practices of these 
states. As Culic argues, citizenship policies in this region are deter-
mined mainly by nation-building processes and are “shaped by elite 
and popular visions of the state [belonging to a titular nation] (...) as 
5 Smith, Antony: National Identity. London: Penguine Books. 1991. 
6 Tajfel, Henri: Differentiations between social groups. Chicago: Academic Press. 
1978. 
7 De Cilia, Rudolf (et al).: The discoursive construction of national identities. 
Discourse and Society. 1999, 10 (2). 149 – 173. 
8 Brubaker, Rogers: Ethnicity without groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
2004. 
9 Tilly, Charles: Citizenship, Identity and Social History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1996. 
10 Brochmann, Grete and Seland, Idunn: Citizenship policies and ideas of nationhood 
in Scandinavia. Citizenship Studies. 2010, 14 (4). 429 – 443. 
11 Kántor, Zoltán: The Concept of Nation in the ECE „Status” Laws. Central Euro-
pean Political Science Review. 2004, 5 (16). 29-39. 
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well as by perceived threats to its integrity and welfare.”12 Offering 
citizenship for co-ethnics living abroad is common in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Nation-states in this part of the world often give 
quasi-citizenship, citizenship-related rights or external citizenship 
to their kin minorities abroad. This kind of proactive policy towards 
ethnic kin is not only based on historical ties or feelings of belonging 
but is based on the principle of responsibility on part of the kin-state, 
saying that the kin-state should protect its co-ethnics living in neigh-
bouring countries.  
Given that countries in the region are multi-ethnic, members 
of different ethnic minority communities often do not identify with 
the state of their citizenship but rather with their kin-state.13 This 
could be the reason why they sometimes feel that they are outsiders 
in society – where the citizenship of the state and their nationality 
is different from the majority of that country. This feeling of being 
alienated is stronger in countries where minority communities have 
to face assimilation, discrimination or limitation of their minority 
rights. In these cases, the citizenship of the state in which they live 
has an empty meaning since they feel they rather belong to their kin-
state.
Kin-State Policies towards Ethnic Hungarians and 
Romanians Living Abroad
For a better understanding of the current situation and the current 
processes of self-identification of the minorities under scrutiny, let 
us briefly describe relations between the Hungarians in Slovakia and 
the Romanians in Serbia and Ukraine and their respective relation to 
their kin-state. These relations translate into the content of respec-
tive state citizenship policies, as described by Iordachi, ‘as part of 
more generalized attempts at reconstructing the national ‘imagined 
communities’, against the background of post-communist socio-polit-
ical and territorial reorganization’.14
12 Culic, Irina: Dual Citizenship Policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Working 
Papers in Romanian Minority Studies. 2009, 5. 149 – 173. 
13 Kymlicka, Will: Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. 
14 Constantin, Iordachi: Dual Citizenship and Policies towards Kin minorities in East-
Central Europe: A Comparison between Hungary, Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova. In Kántor, Zoltán; Majtényi, Balázs; Ieda, Osamu; Vizi, Balázs; Halász, 
Iván (Eds.): The Hungarian Status Law Syndrome: A Nation Building and/or 
Minority Protection. Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University. 2004. 
pp. 239 – 269. 
Citizenship and Identity 19
For ethnic Hungarian communities, the changes of 1989 meant a 
new opportunity to reorganise the institutional, social and political 
framework of their minority societies on the territory of the nation-
alising states in which they were living. As such, the first and most 
important goal was to (re)create and sustain their own minority 
institutions, education and culture, strengthen minority language 
usage, and establish a strong network of civil and political represen-
tation. For these reasons, in the early times of regime transforma-
tion, diplomatic relations between Hungary and the host states of 
the Hungarian minority abroad had an important role in developing 
domestic relations between the minority and majority communities.15 
This came to a stop with the acceptance of the Hungarian Status 
Law in 2001 that changed the whole character of relations between 
Hungary and its neighbours. The law combined ethnic, legal and 
territorial principles for granting benefits to the Hungarians abroad. 
These were perceived as controversial by the neighbouring states. 
While the law was softened in the following years, 2010 brought a 
new direction to Hungarian policy towards ethnic kin living in neigh-
bouring countries: Hungary introduced preferential naturalisation 
together with voting rights as a new political-legal tool to serve its 
trans-border nation-building process to re-unite the nation.  
When the Hungarian government accepted the amendment 
of its citizenship law offering extra territorial citizenship for 
Hungarian kin-minorities living in neighbouring countries without 
residence requirements in Hungary, Slovakia was the only country 
that responded to this decision by legal means. On the day of the 
Hungarian decision, the Slovak government accepted an amendment 
to the Slovak citizenship law that outlawed dual citizenship.16 Albeit, 
Slovakia tolerated the practice of dual nationality and until 2005 also 
offered citizenship for ethnic Slovaks residing abroad,17 Hungarian 
preferential naturalisation was unacceptable for the Slovak govern-
15 Sata, Robert: The geopolitics of minority politics: minority rights under Europe-
anisation in East-Central Europe. In Fisher, Sabine; Pleines, Heiko (eds.).: The 
EU and Central and Eastern Europe: Successes and Failures of Europeanisation in 
Politics and Society. Stuttgart: ibidem – Verlag, 2009. pp. 15-25. 
16 Predpis č. 250/2010 Z. z.Zákon, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon Národnej rady 
Slovenskej republiky č. 40/1993 Z. z. o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky v 
znení neskorších predpisov. (Act No 250/2010 Coll. On Nationality of the Slovak 
Republic) č. 
17 In 1997, the Slovak Republic passed Act No. 70/1997 on Expatriate Slovaks and was 
the first country in the region which offered extraterritorial citizenship for Slovak 
expatriates living abroad. After 2005 preferential naturalisation of Slovak expatri-
ates is possible only after living at least three years permanently on the territory of 
the country. 
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ment.18 Slovak political elites did not deny that the reason for this 
strict amendment was not only that one could question the loyalty 
of ethnic Hungarians opting for the citizenship but the fear that 
Hungarian preferential naturalisation would endanger the security 
and territory of the Slovak state itself. 
When Romania was created as a state in 185919 and 1877-7820, 
roughly 8 million ethnic Romanians were to be found outside the 
newly created country: mainly in the regions of Bucovina, Transyl-
vania and Banat belonging to the Hapsburg Empire and in the region 
of Bessarabia belonging to the Tsarist Empire. After World War I, 
Transylvania, Eastern Banat, Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia 
were united what has since been known as Greater Romania. Greater 
Romania between the two world wars was the largest Romanian 
state. Romania within its current reduced borders emerged after 
World War II, losing Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and Herta to 
the Soviet Union and Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. Romanians can 
be found mainly along the borders of present-day Romania and they 
form minorities in various countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The exception to it is the Republic of Moldova where the identity of 
the majority of the population – Moldovan or Romanian – has been 
for long and is still much of a political issue. In Romania, these Roma-
nians are considered “Romanians abroad” (“Românii de Pretutin-
deni”) and a department of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
is dedicated to handle them. The expression “Romanians abroad” 
includes Romanians in Serbia, Ukraine and Moldova, where they 
are autochthonous, as well as Romanians in Italy, France or Canada 
where they have recently emigrated.
Romanian authorities have long been proactive in giving some 
form of support and protection to Romanians abroad, and Traian 
Băsescu, for example, has been a strong support for Moldovans and 
a strong advocate of the unification between the two countries. For 
Romanians in Serbia and Ukraine, the support is mainly educational 
and cultural. Nevertheless, the most important Romanian policy 
towards its nationals abroad has been linked to its law on citizen-
ship that was first passed after the fall of communism. It was later 
modified and is still sometimes discussed and raised in public debate. 
18 Kusá, Dagmar: The Slovak question and the Slovak Answer: Citizenship During 
the Quest for National Self-determination and After. In Bauböck, Rainer; 
Perchinig,Bernhard; Sievers, Wiebke (Eds.): Citizenship Policies in the New Europe. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 2009. 275–304.
19 First time the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were united to form the 
Romanian United Principalities, which later became officially known as ‘Romania’.
20 When Romania was declared independent from the Ottoman Empire.
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Romanians in Bukovina, a region that was part of one of the histor-
ical provinces of Romania and that was a part of Greater Romania 
between the two World Wars can, just like citizens of the neighboring 
Republic of Moldova, “regain” Romanian citizenship. They can apply 
for Romanian citizenship if they are able to prove that one of their 
ancestors was a citizen of Greater Romania between the two World 
Wars. Nevertheless, Ukrainian citizens cannot hold double citizen-
ship and have to give up Ukrainian citizenship if they want to be 
Romanian citizens. In Serbia, the situation is different, as citizens of 
Serbia are not included in this framework of regaining Romanian citi-
zenship since Voivodina and Central Serbia have never been Roma-
nian territories. Therefore, Romanians from Serbia need to follow 
the regular process of obtaining Romanian citizenship.
Community Ties and Identity Structures
We believe minority or ethnic identity is a construction that is not a 
given but is expressed in concrete situations. It is also a tool of self-
representation of the individual. Focus-group discussions enabled 
us to follow and examine different social practices, how individuals 
identify themselves and also how they relate to other members of the 
community. To analyse the structure of minority identities our point 
of departure was Brubaker’s triadic model – we assume that ethnic 
kin living in neighbouring countries around Hungary and Romania 
have different attitudes towards the state in which they live, towards 
their kin-state, and towards their own minority communities. These 
multiple attachments and the fact that they are members of a minority 
community create a special, multi-layered identity structure that is 
also reflected well in the role they attribute to and the relations they 
have towards languages – both their mother tongue and the official 
language: 
In Bukovina, cultural interferences are important. It’s a smaller version of Europe, 
between East and West, a model of interethnic harmony where people live as Euro-
peans. (MUkr)
In our region we often mix Slovak with Hungarian. (...) In Gömör21 we have our 
own small world and we are closely connected to the Slovaks living here. It often 
happens that we start the sentence in Hungarian and end in the Slovak language... 
and we also borrow some expressions from the Romani language… (FG3Sk) 
21 A historical region in the central part of Slovakia. 
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Importance of languages can also be found in the music written 
by a young Ukrainian student, the lyrics being “in three languages, 
in Russian, in Romanian and in Ukrainian” (FG1Ukr) because these 
are the three languages he is constantly in contact with and are the 
markers of his identity. But this construction of multiple (language) 
identity is the outcome of a necessity developed in the particular 
context of the place where those minorities live:
Each Romanian from Bukovina knows Romanian, because it’s their mother tongue, 
each also knows Ukrainian and Russian. Each does not really master Ukrainian 
but each speaks it, you have to. You turn on the TV and you see news in Ukrainian. 
(FDUkr)
It is not only multiple languages that minority members need to 
master but their self-identification is made harder by the fact that 
the borders of the homeland (the motherland) and the borders of the 
state in which they live are not the same. We asked participants to 
identify their homeland in order to examine how they conceptualize 
their bonds to the region where they live and also how they under-
stand their relation to their kin-state and the state of their residence. 
From the responses of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia we learn 
that homeland is defined regionally – it is the region where they are 
living their everyday lives or where they were born. Participants do 
not name either Slovakia or Hungary as their homeland, some explic-
itly refuse to make the choice between the kin and the host-state. 
Moreover, for a minority of the participants, homeland is only a spir-
itual concept connected to the Carpathian basin or to the Hungarian 
nation itself. 
It is also important that the feeling of “homelessness” was 
mentioned in all of the Hungarian focus-groups in Slovakia, pointing 
out that the minority identity structures are closely connected with 
feelings of insecurity – these Hungarian communities are involuntary 
communities that came into being as a result of a political decision, 
the Trianon Treaty.22 Some participants even go further and feel 
betrayed by their nation because of a failed referendum in Hungary 
that asked the population whether it supported citizenship for their 
kin abroad:
I think there are only a few people from our generation who identify themselves as 
Hungarians and Slovakia as their homeland. Hungary did not support us on the 
22 Bárdi, Nándor: Magyarország és a kisebbségi magyar közösségek 1989 után. 
Metszetek – Társadalomtudományi folyóirat. 2013, 2-3. 40-79.
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5th of December23, so ... we are living here... We are here...we are taxpayers here, but 
we do not have our own homeland. (FG2Sk) 
The situation is rather different for Romanians whose definition 
of the homeland is also often very regional, yet seems more secure. 
Both Romanian minorities in Serbia and Ukraine seem to share a 
strong identification to a sometimes idealized multilingual and multi-
cultural model of the region in which they live. This is well exempli-
fied by the case of Romanians in Voivodina, as expressed in this focus-
group in Novi Sad, the capital of this Serbian region:
I believe that Voivodina is particular, because there are many different minorities. 
They all live together. It’s a multicultural territory and we are proud of it. So many 
minorities living together, it’s something unique in Europe, I believe. (FG2Ser)
Both in Serbia and Ukraine, the strong identification with the 
region is reinforced when people compare, spontaneously, their situ-
ation and feelings to those who have arrived and settled recently. The 
“outsiders” are seen as somehow breaking the tradition and the shared 
culture of the region. In Voivodina, for instance, refugees from the war 
in Bosnia were characterised as those who “throw their garbage out 
through their windows”, are “more impulsive” and often create “scan-
dals” (FG1Ser). Romanians in Ukraine also characterise Galicians 
living in Bukovina as less tolerant and more “agitated” (FG3Ukr). In 
addition to this strong regional self-identification, Romanian minority 
members also feel an emotional attachment to their kin-state, but 
differently from what we have observed in Slovakia, feelings of loyalty 
towards their state of residence are often mentioned even though it is 
not part of the conception of their homeland.
‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’
As these last examples show, the construction of sameness is often 
linked to the definition of the ‘other’. Here we refer to Brubaker’s and 
Cooper’s arguments that “as a specifically collective phenomenon, 
identity denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among 
members of a group or category. This sameness is expected to mani-
fest itself in solidarity.”24 During focus-group discussions we also ask 
23 Referendum about extra-territorial, non-resident citizenship to ethnic Hungarians 
living outside Hungary on the 5th December, 2004.   
24 Brubaker, Rogers and Cooper, Frederick: Beyond Identity. Theory and Society. 
2000, 29. 1-47. 
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participants what they think about Hungarians living in Hungary or 
about Romanians living in Romania in order to determine the exist-
ence of the assumed ethnocentrism that distinguishes culturally and 
mentally the Hungarians/Romanians living in Hungary/Romania 
from Hungarians/Romanians living outside the borders of Hungary/
Romania.25 
The responses show that there is little “sameness” for the minori-
ties with the “majority Hungarians”. Even though some respond-
ents share some positive sentiments about the Hungarians living 
in Hungary, negative prejudices are dominant. There is a deep 
structural division, an invisible mental barrier: belonging to the 
Hungarian nation is natural for those who are living in Hungary, but 
for Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, it is an emotionally, 
culturally determined question, which influences their everyday lives 
and practices. We can say that the most important differences become 
permanent, the cultural production of borders is continuous and is 
most intense when it comes to the links to the Hungarian nation and 
the meaning of national symbols.  
 XY, he just kissed his Hungarian identity card... He was so happy... He was a 
Hungarian citizen in 1912, when he was born, and for him spiritually... He showed 
all of his honours from World War II when he got the card and he was crying. So, 
you will not understand this symbol there in Budapest, here we appreciate it more... 
(FG2Sk) 
We find that when Hungarian citizens identify themselves as 
members of a “majority” towards other ethnic Hungarians this affects 
self-identification of these people negatively. It is also a common expe-
rience of everyday life for the participants that Hungarian citizens in 
Hungary lack knowledge about them, about their conditions or basic 
characteristics as manifested in questions like: 
When I was younger and I was in Hungary, some of the Hungarians asked me 
whether we have television at home or not. Because they thought we are poorer than 
they are. But they were also shocked because of my dialect. (FG2Sk)  
We also have to add that Hungarians from neighbouring countries 
are often labelled as immigrants in Hungary or just called ‘Slovaks’ 
after their country of residence. This attitude is also observable in 
25 Csepeli, György; Örkény, Antal; Székelyi, Mária: Nemzetek egymás tükrében. 
Interetnikus viszonyok a Kárpát-medencében. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó. 2002. 
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their identity structures, however, it is conceptualised as a founda-
tion for being different: 
For me the fact that I am Hungarian does not mean that I am “Hungarian 
Hungarian” – it is important for me to identify myself as “Hungarian from 
Slovakia”… Because it is totally different to be a Hungarian from Slovakia and 
that’s why we have to say from which country we are coming from. (FG5Hun) 
Even though some of the participants have had everyday contacts 
with Hungary or Hungarians living in Hungary for decades, the lack 
of knowledge of the other and stereotypes are distancing these two 
communities from each other mainly symbolically. 
For Romanians, sameness seems to be more emphasized, both in 
Ukraine and in Serbia. Romanians living in Western Banat feel closely 
connected to those Romanians who are living in the Eastern Banat 
region in Romania. Those who belong to the majority are also part of 
this understanding of a regional identity, at least when it comes to 
how minority members think about it. General opinions about Roma-
nians in Romania and about Romania are usually positive, even more 
since Romania entered the European Union, but the fact that they 
live in different states plays an important role in their identification 
structures, but not so dominantly, as in the case of ethnic Hungar-
ians living in Slovakia. These differences were explained by a Roma-
nian originally from Romania but who moved to Serbia:
There are differences and similarities between Romanians here and there, as for 
any people, like between Serbs in Romania and Serbs in Serbia. I think this is 
logical because, for their whole life, they have been living here, and the mentality 
of peoples differs. But their mentality is closer to that of the majority. (…) A state 
shapes you (OPSer)
This reflects exactly what an older woman in Novi Sad said:
Serbs are tough and they made me as I am. I cannot be soft like a pancake. (VMSer)
This shows that even though sameness is emphasized, Romanians 
in Serbia and Ukraine, just like Hungarians in Slovakia, exhibit a 
‘nuanced identity’26 compared to compatriots in the kin-state.
26 Danero Iglesias, Julien and Stănculescu, Cristina: Identités nuancées à la fron-
tière de l’Union européenne. Cahul, Moldavie. Studia Politica: Romanian Political 
Science Review. 2013, 13(3). 457-475.
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Citizenship
We claimed citizenship can be interpreted as a flexible bond between 
the state and the individual27 and in the case of dual citizenship the 
value of the different citizenships may be unequal for their owners.28 
We also analyse and compare different aspects of the already 
given Slovak/Serb/Ukrainian and the ‘new’, individually acquired 
Hungarian/Romanian citizenships and its ‘values’ for our partici-
pants. The aim is to understand how citizenship(s) can be integrated 
(or not) into the identity structures of participants, to see the rela-
tions between these categories, and explore the structure of identity/
citizenship hierarchy built from these categories. 
For Hungarians in Slovakia, almost everyone described Slovak 
citizenship as an empty link with the state. Citizenship by the state 
of residence is interpreted mainly as a legal bond only, a group of 
rights and obligations. The reason is – as participants explained – 
that they, as citizens who have other than Slovak nationality, feel 
themselves outsiders, whose community is not involved in the state-
building process. 
I hear the Slovak anthem for instance, every midnight on television. Just look at those 
photos shown in this short video. They show all of the important regions in Slovakia, 
except the Southern region. (…) This is a symbol for me that they think that we are not 
involved in their social and political systems, they think that we are just outsiders who 
live here, but that’s all… and we think that we are outsiders, too. (FGSk3) 
Such attitudes can also be observed in case of Romanians living 
outside of Romania whose only ‘true’ citizenship is Romanian, all 
other citizenships are less valuable:
I have the documents. They show that I was born in 1938, in this village, in this 
district, with the year, the hour, the day. And it’s written in Romanian. When the 
USSR came, they freed us, they occupied us, and they changed our citizenship. 
They took it, brutally, automatically, and wrote “citizen of the Soviet Union”. At 
independence, Ukraine made me a Ukrainian citizen. But did they all ask me? No. 
I remain the same as when I was born. (ABUkr)
While we see that ethnic Romanians consider their Serbian and 
Ukrainian citizenships as mainly legal bonds, as the link to the terri-
27 Ong, Aihwa: Flexible Citizenship: the Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: 
Duke Universtiy Press. 1999. 
28 Soysal, Yasemine Nuhoglu. Limits of citizenship: Migrants and Postnational 
Membership in Europe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1994. 
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tory and to the country where members of the minority were born 
– exactly as we observed in the case of the Hungarians in Slovakia 
– there is also an important difference because these citizenships 
are not on the whole considered empty shells. Going along with the 
regional identification that we described earlier, there is a sense of 
identification with and maybe even loyalty to the state that they live 
in because both in Serbia and in Ukraine, the Romanians we inter-
rogated feel that they have a say in their country because they are 
ethnically ‘different’ but ‘equal’ in rights to the majority (FG1Ser):
I can tell you that we all have rights, we have schools, we have media, we feel like 
home, we’re from here. We don’t feel like a minority. Yes, we are less numerous, 
but we are autochthonous, our ancestors came here about 300 years ago. (AUSer)
I never felt that someone had not given me the right to speak, to sing, to… I don’t 
know. We have a radio, we have magazines, we have everything. (FG3Ukr)
Looking at kin-state citizenship, Hungarians from Slovakia who 
have acquired Hungarian citizenship describe this new relation as an 
emotional connection to the nation and not to the country itself. 
For me, for example, it was really important that the Hungarian government accepted 
the amendment … finally. […] here is the compensation for 5th of December 2004. 
There is a historical continuity created with the people. I was smiling a lot when this 
came into my mind that finally we have this opportunity. (...) Finally there is a call 
from the kin-state towards the Hungarians living around Hungary. (FG5Hun)
The same emotion can be found for Romanians in Bukovina, 
where regaining Romanian citizenship is seen as a historical right 
after the minority was separated from the “historical motherland” 
(LCUkr) in a similar way that Hungary lost its territories:
[Those who have regained citizenship] have the right to such citizenship because 
their parents have never given up Romanian citizenship. They were dispossessed. 
Now Romania has adopted a civilised and rightful law, I would say, through 
which historical justice is restored. (NTUkr)
Citizens of Serbia are not included in this framework of regaining 
Romanian citizenship. Therefore, Romanians from Serbia need to 
follow the regular process of obtaining citizenship, and some of them 
do it (ECSer). In this situation, some feel frustrated and do not under-
stand why some Romanians from Moldova or Ukraine can regain 
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citizenship while Romanians from Serbia have no such opportunity 
(IBSer) and feel that Romania does not care about them (NCSer) – a 
feeling we observed also among Hungarians in Slovakia when they 
talk about the failed referendum for extending Hungarian citizenship 
to them. That event is still considered by many as reminiscence of the 
nation abandoning them:
I’ll die and we won’t have Romanian citizenship. Hungary gave citizenship to its 
citizens, Slovakia gave it, Bulgaria gave it, Macedonia gave it, and Croatia gave 
it. Everyone has given it. We are the only ones who haven’t got it from Romania. 
Our ancestors came from Romania 300 years ago and migrated here, we are Roma-
nians, and we are parts of the Romanian people. (NCSer)
The majority of Hungarian participants in Slovakia, however, did 
not accept ‘emotions’ as reason for acquiring Hungarian citizenship – 
they connect citizenship with the territory of the state in which they 
live and they do not step out from this framework. Without a “real” 
relation with Hungary, it was unimaginable for these ethnic Hungar-
ians to acquire the citizenship. 
I think Hungarian citizenship is important only if I move to Hungary. Because 
after moving there I will not be called Slovak, like now, because now I’m Slovak 
there. (FG2Sk)
It is also interesting to note that at the same time the majority 
of the participants assume that the aim of offering citizenship by 
the kin-state is to reinforce and support their Hungarian identity. 
However, they argue that Hungarian citizenship is not connected to 
their Hungarian self-identification:  
We can bring up the next generation here. We have our rights, our schools here. I 
do not feel I would have some benefits from Hungarian citizenship. I feel myself 
Hungarian without any Hungarian citizenship. (FG4Sk)
Something similar is observable in case of Romanians living 
abroad, showing that the link to the ‘nation’ goes further than citi-
zenship:
How could a passport help? I am Romanian, my husband is Romanian, my 
parents… My children go to a Romanian school. I speak Romanian. Why would 
I need a Romanian passport? I feel Romanian here. And I don’t have a passport. 
(FG2Ukr.)
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Yet others opt for the citizenship for more instrumental reasons. 
Like in Slovakia, Ukrainian citizens cannot have double citizenship. 
However, individuals we met admitted that they have it, or confirmed 
it indirectly (DCUkr, VTUkr), or told that lots of people in Ukraine have 
it (NHUkr). Ukrainian citizens know that “it is not allowed” but that 
“it is not forbidden” (Fg2Ukr) and explain that Ukrainian authorities 
are suspected to have many different citizenships, sometimes even 
“four, five or six” different ones (FG2Ukr). Even border guards would 
understand when meeting Ukrainian citizens at the border with both 
Romanian and Ukrainian passports (VBUkr), even though “many 
have been punished” for having double citizenship “some time ago” 
(FG2Ukr). Gaining citizenship allows you to travel freely, when one 
is “sick of Ukraine” (ABUkr), or avoid working illegally in Europe:
Lots of citizens say they are Romanian… Many go for citizenship ceremonies in 
Romania. This is a joke. They want to freely enter Europe, they want to be able to 
work. It is difficult to go to Europe, visas are expensive and, usually, you’re only 
considered as a tourist. Therefore, in Europe, you’re illegal and you hide. Until 
they catch you. If they catch you, you’re sent back. And here we go again if you don’t 
have a Romanian passport. (VBUkr)
Interpretation of second citizenship as an instrumental tool is also 
visible in the example of a participant in Voivodina. In this discus-
sion not only citizenship offered by Romania was discussed but also 
the option of Hungarian citizenship. Citizenship offered by Hungary 
through preferential naturalization is also one of the options to go 
“West”, escape from the circumstances or make life easier. Again, 
citizenship from a European Union country is seen as a plus, allowing 
movement abroad and to see better things (FG2Ser) and some “do it” 
“only to leave” (VPSer) as it means having a “better life” (FG2Ser):
I could obtain 15 times – and I probably will – Bulgarian citizenship. But I have to 
go twice to Sofia and this is quite bothersome as it is quite far. (NCSer)
This shows that, for some, if Romania has not given citizenship to 
Romanians from Voivodina, they can try to obtain Hungarian citizen-
ship, or Bulgarian citizenship like in the last example, because this is 
their legal right (FG2Ser).
Nevertheless, along with these instrumental forms of attach-
ment to Romanian identity, other non-instrumental attachments to 
national identity have been often identified during our field research. 
In Serbia and Ukraine, the persons we talked to all showed loyalty to 
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the state they live in but showed at the same time a strong Romanian 
identity (MMSer, TUSer, OMUkr, VTUkr), even if they have never 
been to Romania (DSSer) or even if sometimes some feel some shame 
when speaking Romanian in public (MMSer, FG1Ser, FG1Ukr, 
FG2Ukr, FG3Ukr). When asking if they would apply for Hungarian 
citizenship, some Romanians from Serbia answer that they “would 
feel strange” as they “wouldn’t know the language” (ECSer) or that it 
would mean “selling” themselves (DSSer).
Conclusion
Despite diverse background and motivation of kin-state policies of 
Hungary and Romania, we can explore some similarities within the 
effects of their citizenship practices. In both cases extending citi-
zenship is a basic tool of kin-state policy to (re)build the nation. 
However, as we can see above, recipients of this citizenship have 
unequal valuation and differentiation of citizenship. The reasons are 
multiple because citizenships do not have equal “values” for the indi-
viduals. As Spiro argued, “dual citizenship will almost always include 
one citizenship that is dearer than the other,”29 and we observe that 
this choice is contextual, very much reflecting the individual circum-
stances for all of the minority members.
The most important difference between choices of the Hungar-
ians in Slovakia and the choices of Romanians in Serbia and Ukraine 
seems to go hand-in-hand with EU membership. We have noted that 
in case of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, Hungarian prefer-
ential naturalisation caused deep cleavages between participants – 
some saw it as a formal proof of their sense of belonging, a paper-
based emotional tie, while others could not think of any reason to 
claim it. In case of ethnic Romanians in Serbia and Ukraine it was 
only a minority who agreed there was no need for Romanian citi-
zenship to feel Romanian, the majority interpreted kin-state citizen-
ship as an “exit ticket”30 giving them additional options in life. This 
clearly reflects an instrumental understanding of citizenship for the 
majority of ethnic Romanians we talked to, while only few of the 
ethnic Hungarians we talked to expressed such attitudes.
We can argue that preferential naturalisation by the kin-state is 
important for the self-identification of minority members even if it is 
29 Spiro, Peter: Dual citizenship as human right. International Journal of Constitu-
tional Law. 2010, 8 (1). 111-130. 
30 Bieber, Florian: Dual citizenship can be a solution, not a problem. In Rainer, Bauböck 
(ed.): Dual citizenship for transborder minorities? How to respond to the Hungarian-
Slovak tit-for-tat. EUDO Citizenship. (Fiesola: EUI Working Papers, RSCAS, 2010/757).
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so for various reasons. Emotional reasons, the feelings of belonging 
seem to come to the fore only when there are no practical, instru-
mental reasons to opt for the citizenship. However, the importance 
of preferential citizenship should not be overstated as we have seen 
regional identity seems to be a more fundamental identity factor for 
ethnic minorities living on the border of their kin- and host-state. We 
saw that ethnic minorities can feel being both unwelcome citizens and 
proud and equal members of the political community of their host-
state, depending on how they perceive that their rights are respected. 
While there are differences in how different the minority members 
perceive themselves from their ethnic kin, we must also note that 
both ethnic Hungarians and Romanians perceived themselves being 
different from citizens of Hungary and Romania. These feelings are 
only reinforced by the ignorance of kin-state majorities that often lack 
knowledge about their ethnic kin abroad or treat them as second class 
members of the nation. As such, the local/regional minority commu-
nity seems to enjoy primacy over the larger nation and the primary 
interest of the minority people is to preserve their identity facing chal-
lenges of assimilation, migration, or high level unemployment.
It is the local/regional differences, the experience of the minority 
people of living together not with their ethnic kin but their co-nationals 
that seems to uphold the barriers between the ethnic kin living on 
the opposite sides of the borders. Preferential naturalization and 
newly gained citizenship of the kin-state can be very important either 
for emotional or instrumental reasons but only for some. Others will 
ignore it, claiming their identity depends much more in being able to 
maintain and develop their local/regional identity through rights and 
minority protection. All of the above suggests that what we witness 
is a continuous interplay of the different identities that each of the 
members of ethnic communities possesses, where each and every 
individual constructs and reconstructs his or her hierarchy of the 
different identities based on contextual circumstances.
The participants who supported preferential naturalisation 
offered by the Hungarian government connected citizenship to their 
national self-identification. For these participants Hungarian citizen-
ship is equal to the feeling that they belong to the Hungarian nation 
and they have a real, “paper based” connection with the kin-state. 
For them, Hungarian citizenship is something that reinforces them 
“being Hungarian” and helps step out from minority circumstances 
that are connected with the feeling of insecurity.31 This kind of 
31 Papp, Attila Z.: Kisebbségi identitáskonstrukciók a kettôs magyar állampolgárság 
által. REGIO. 2014, 22 (1). 118-151.
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“emotional understanding” of citizenship was expressed differently 
by the ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine and Serbia. Participants 
living in Serbia were critical about the unfairness of Romanian kin 
state policy – but not because they connected citizenship with their 
national self-identification, but because of other, much more prac-
tical reasons. For participants in Ukraine, it was also a “right” that 
was taken away from them after Wold War II.
In case of ethnic Hungarians, the majority of the participants, 
however, did not connect citizenship with emotions. They concep-
tualised its meaning from their minority perspective mainly. First, 
Hungarian citizenship by itself does not solve the main problems of their 
own minority community such as assimilation, migration, and high 
level of unemployment. Second, citizenship is not able to strengthen 
their national self-identification, because these are separated from each 
other. Third, both Slovakia and Hungary are members of the EU and 
Hungarian citizenship does not offer practical or special benefits for 
them. From this point of view Hungarian citizenship is “just another 
piece of paper”. This kind of understanding is also observable among 
ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine and Serbia. However, for them 
this kind of ‘piece of paper’ is much more valuable because it has more 
potential than the original one. Citizenship offered by the kin-state is 
conceptualised as a bridge to Europe, through it they can find better 
options somewhere else, outside of Serbia or Ukraine. In both cases, the 
citizenship offered by the kin-state is not already given, so members of 
these communities can enjoy the freedom of choice and decide individu-
ally to acquire it or not. In both cases citizenship offered by the kin-
state is conceptualised mainly instrumentally. While in Slovakia most 
of our participants think Hungarian citizenship is important only when 
someone is living in Hungary, most of the participants in Ukraine and 
Serbia think, Romanian citizenship is an exit ticket for them or a tool to 
find better circumstances somewhere else. 
The most important common point in this research is, that according 
to discussions of the minorities, regional self-identification is reinforced 
when they think about the meaning of their citizenship(s). We have seen 
that minorities do not necessarily identify themselves with the other 
members of their home-state or with those who are living in their kin-
state. Neither the majority of ethnic Romanians in Serbia or Ukrain nor 
the majority of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia think that citizenship 
practices could influence their national self-identification. Instead they 
argue relations with their minority communities and regional identifica-
tion are much more important.
